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Abstract—Proxy re-encryption (PRE), introduced by
Blaze et al. in 1998, allows a semi-trusted proxy with
the re-encryption key to translate a ciphertext under
the delegator into another ciphertext, which can be
decrypted by the delegatee. In this process, the proxy
is required to know nothing about the plaintext. Many
PRE schemes have been proposed so far, however until
now almost all the unidirectional PRE schemes suffer
from the transferable property. That is, if the proxy
and a set of delegatees collude, they can re-delegate the
delegator’s decryption rights to the other ones, while the
delegator has no agreement on this. Thus designing non-
transferable unidirectional PRE scheme is an important
open research problem in the ﬁeld. In this paper, we
tackle this open problem by using the composite order
bilinear pairing. Concretely, we design a non-transferable
unidirectional PRE scheme based on Hohenberger et al.’s
unidirectional PRE scheme. Furthermore, we discuss our
scheme’s application to secure cloud storage, especially
for sharing private multimedia content for social cloud
storage users.
I. INTRODUCTION
Proxy re-encryption scheme was ﬁrst proposed by
Blaze, Bleumer and Strauss [1] in 1998, which allows
the proxy to transform a ciphertext for Alice into a
ciphertext of the same message for Bob. During the
transformation, the proxy learns nothing about the un-
derlying message. In 2005, Ateniese et al. [2] ﬁrst pro-
posed a unidirectional proxy re-encryption and deﬁned
nine interesting notions for proxy re-encryption: uni-
directional, non-interactive, proxy invisible, original-
access, key optimal, collusion-safe, temporary, non-
transitive, non-transferable. Until now, there have not
been deﬁned yet PRE schemes satisfying these nine
properties simultaneously. Among these properties,
non-transferability seems to be a very difﬁcult one to
achieve. A proxy re-encryption scheme is said to be
non-transferable if the proxy and a set of colluding
delegatees cannot re-delegate decryption rights to other
parties without compromising any malicious delega-
tee’s decryption capability, in the sense that the only
way for Bob to transfer Alice’s decryption capability
is to expose his own secret key. In all known PRE
constructions, if Bob and a malicious proxy collude,
they can derive new re-encryption keys for Charlie
without Alice’s agreement. Non-transferable property
can be seen as a trade-off solution to protect Alice’s
beneﬁt in delegating her decryption right: when a mali-
cious delegatee Bob colludes with the proxy to transfer
Alice’s decryption capability to others, he must expose
his own decryption capability as a pay. This notion
emphasis that Bob cannot collude with the proxy and
transfer Alice’s decryption right without compromising
his own decryption capability. Since its introduction,
PRE scheme has found many applications, such as key
distribution [1], key escrow [3], distributed ﬁle systems
[2], [4], multicast [5], anonymous communication [6].
Recently, along with the rapid development of cloud
computation [7]–[9]. More recently, PRE has been used
extensively in secure cloud storage for content sharing
such as DFA-based FPRE system [10]–[13].
A. Our Contribution
To the best of our knowledge, until now there are no
natural non-transferable proxy re-encryption schemes
without obfuscation or involving with PKG. In this
paper, we tackle the non-transferable problem by using
the composite order bilinear pairing. Concretely, we
design a non-transferable scheme based on Hohen-
berger et al.’s unidirectional PRE scheme (Shacham’s
Linear Encryption Scheme). We also present a secure
social cloud storage sharing framework based on our
non-transferable proxy re-encryption scheme.
B. Organization
Our paper is organized as the following: In Sec-
tion II, we ﬁrst review Hohenberger et al.’s PRE
scheme and then propose our construction based on it.
We also roughly sketch the analysis of our scheme and
show it can achieve non-transferability. In Section III,
we present a framework for secure social cloud storage
sharing based on our proposal. We conclude our paper
in the last Section IV.
II. OUR CONSTRUCTION
A. Review of Hohenberger et al.’s unidirectional PRE
scheme
In this subsection, we review of Hohenberger et al.’s
unidirectional PRE scheme proposed in TCC’07 [14],
based on which we propose our construction.
1) Setup. The scheme operating over two groups
G1, G2 of prime order q with a bilinear map
e : G1 × G1 → G2. The system parameters are
random generators g ∈ G1 and Z = e(g, g) ∈
G2.
2) KeyGen. A user A’s key pair is of the form
pkA = (g
a1 , gb1), skA = (a1, b1), a user B’s
key pair is of the form pkB = (ga2 , gb2), skB =
(a2, b2), a user C’s key pair is of the form pkC =
(ga3 , gb3), skC = (a3, b3), etc.
3) ReKeyGen. A user A delegates to B by pub-
lishing the re-encryption key
rkA→B = (Z1, Z2) = (ga2/a1 , gb2/b1)
computed from A’s secret key and B’s public key.
4) Second-Level Encryption. To encrypt a mes-
sage m ∈ G under pkA in such a way that it
can be decrypted by A and her delegatees, the
encrypter computes
C2A = (W,X, Y ) = (g
a1r, gb1s,mgr+s)
as the ciphertext.
5) First-Level Encryption. To encrypt a message
m ∈ G2 under pkA in such a way that it can
only be decrypted by the holder of skA, output
C1A = (E,F,G)
= (e(g, g)a1r, e(g, g)b1s, e(g,m)e(g, g)r+s)
6) Re-Encryption. The proxy can re-encrypt a
second-level ciphertext for A into a ﬁrst-level
ciphertext for B with rkA→B . From C2A =
(W,X, Y ) = (ga1r, gb1s,mgr+s), compute
C1B = (E,F,G)
= (e(W,Z1), e(X,Z2), e(Y, g))
= (e(g, g)a2r, e(g, g)b2s, e(g,m)e(g, g)r+s)
7) Second-Level Decryption. To decrypt a
second-level ciphertext C2A = (W,X, Y ) =
(ga1r, gb1s,mgr+s) with secret key
skA = (a1, b1), A computes
m =
Y
W 1/a1X1/b1
8) First-Level Decryption. To decrypt a ﬁrst-level
ciphertext C1A = (E,F,G) with secret key
skA = (a1, b1), A ﬁrst computes
Q =
G
E1/a1F 1/b1
and then output message m in the message space
M such that e(m, g) = Q. Of course, to ensure
efﬁcient decryption, this limits the size of the
message space M to be a polynomial.
B. Our Proposal
1) Setup. The scheme operates over two groups
G1, G2 of composite order n = pqh with a
bilinear map e : G1 × G1 → G2. The system
parameters are random generators gp ∈ Gp, gq ∈
Gq , gh ∈ GH . that is, gp, gq , gh are generators
of the subgroup Gp, Gq and Gh. Furthermore,
e(gp, gq) = 1, e(gp, gh) = 1, e(gh, gq) = 1
holds.
2) KeyGen. A user A’s key pair is of the form
pkA = (g
a1
p , g
b1
q , g
c1
h ), skA = (a1, b1, c1), a
user B’s key pair is of the form pkB =
(ga2p , g
b2
q , g
c2
h ), skB = (a2, b2, c2), a user C’s key
pair is of the form pkC = (ga3p , g
b3
q , g
c3
q ), skC =
(a3, b3, c3), etc.
3) ReKeyGen. A user A delegates to B by pub-
lishing the re-encryption key
rkA→B = (Z1, Z2, Z3)
= (g(a2+r
′)/a1
p , g
(b2+s
′)/b1
q , g
c2/c1
h g
r′
p g
s′
q )
computed from A’s secret key and B’s public key.
4) Second-Level Encryption. To encrypt a mes-
sage m under pkA in such a way that it can be
decrypted by A and her delegatees, the encrypter
computes:
C2A = (V,W,X, Y )
= (e(gh, gh)
t, ga1rp , g
b1s
q , g
mtc1
h g
r
pg
s
q)
as the ciphertext.
5) First-Level Encryption. To encrypt a message
m under pkA in such a way that it can only be
decrypted by the holder of skA, output:
C1A = (C
1a
A , C
1b
A )
= (e(gh, gh)
t, e(gh, gh)
mtc1)
6) Re-Encryption. The proxy can re-
encrypt a second-level ciphertext for A
into a ﬁrst-level ciphertext for B with
rkA→B . From C2A = (V,W,X, Y ) =
(e(gh, gh)
t, ga1rp , g
b1s
q , g
mtc1
h g
r
pg
s
q), compute:
(E,F,G) = (
e(W,Z1)
e(ga2p , Y )
,
e(X,Z2)
e(gb2q , Y )
, e(Y, Z3))
= (
e(gp, gp)
a2r+rr
′
e(gp, gp)a2r
,
e(gq, gq)
b2s+ss
′
e(gp, gp)b2s
,
e(gh, gh)
mtc2e(gp, gp)
rr′e(gq, gq)
ss′)
= (e(gp, gp)
rr′ , e(gq, gq)
ss′ ,
e(gh, gh)
mtc2e(gp, gp)
rr′e(gq, gq)
ss′))
Finally the proxy computes
C1B = (C
1a
B , C
1b
B ) = (e(gh, gh)
t, e(gh, gh)
mtc2)
7) Second-Level Decryption. To decrypt a
second-level ciphertext C2A = (V,W,X, Y ) =
(e(gh, gh)
t,
ga1rp , g
b1s
q , g
tc1m
h g
r
pg
s
q) with secret key
skA = (a1, b1, c1), A computes
A = gtc1mh =
Y
W 1/a1X1/b1
,
A′ = e(A, gh) = e(gh, gh)tc1m
and then output message m in the message space
M such that V m = (e(gh, gh)t)m = A′1/c1 .
Of course, to ensure efﬁcient decryption, this
limits the size of the message space M to be
a polynomial.
8) First-Level Decryption. To decrypt a ﬁrst-
level ciphertext C1A = (C
1a
A , C
1b
A ) =
(e(gh, gh)
t, e(gh, gh)
mtc1) with secret key
skA = (a1, b1, c1), A ﬁrst computes
B = (e(gh, gh)
tc1m)1/c1 = e(gh, gh)
tm
and then output message m in the message space
M such that (e(gh, gh)t)m = B. Of course, to
ensure efﬁcient decryption, this limits the size of
the message space M to be a polynomial size.
Remark 1: Why our scheme can achieve non-
transferable property? We can see from:
rkA→B = (Z1, Z2, Z3)
= (g(a2+r
′)/a1
p , g
(b2+s
′)/b1
q , g
c2/c1
h g
r′
p g
s′
q )
and the delegatee’s secret key, other user C’s secret
key:
skB = (a2, b2, c2), skC = (a3, b3, c3)
Thus, the colluders can not compute:
rkA→C = (Z ′1, Z
′
2, Z
′
3)
= (g(a3+r
′′
)/a1
p , g
(b3+s
′′
)/b1
q , g
c3/c1
h g
r
′′
p g
s
′′
q )
III. NT-PRE FOR SECURE SOCIAL CLOUD
STORAGE SHARING
The secure social cloud storage sharing framework
can be designed, using our scheme, as following:
1) Data outsourcing. When Alice travels outside
and wants to share her personal multimedia con-
tent, e.g. pictures, with others, she ﬁrst encrypts
her own traveling photos by the standard encryp-
tion method for JPEG pictures, such as the block
cipher, and then encrypts the block cipher key
with her own public key. Finally, she outsources
the ciphertexts to the cloud, which not only saves
her storage but also is convenient for sharing data
contents with other persons.
2) Delegation of Re-encryption. When one of her
close friends, say Bob, wants to access her pho-
tos, he cannot decrypt Alice’s ciphertext directly,
because the photos are encrypted under Alice’s
public key. In this case, proxy re-encryption can
be used. Alice generates a re-encryption key RK
from Alice to Bob and sends it to the proxy,
which can be a designated server lying in the
cloud.
3) Re-encryption. The proxy ﬁrst retrieves Alice’s
ciphertexts from the cloud storage servers, and
applies the re-encryption key RK to re-encrypt
Alice’s ciphertexts into Bob’s ciphertexts which
Bob can decrypt with his own private key. Then,
the proxy sends the re-encrypted ciphertexts to
Bob.
4) Data Sharing. Bob uses his own private key
to decrypt the re-encrypted ciphertexts, through
which Alice shares her photos with Bob in
the cloud. We note that during the whole re-
encryption process, the sender Alice is online
only when sending the re-encryption key. Be-
sides, we also note that our NT-PRE scheme
prevents a malicious cloud colluding with Bob
to further re-delegate Alice’s decryption rights
to another user Carol, which guaranteed by the
non-transferability property of our scheme (see
Fig. 1).
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Fig. 1. Non-transferable proxy re-encryption for secure social cloud
storage sharing
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper we present a new proposal on non-
transferable proxy re-encryption. To the best of our
knowledge, this proposal is the ﬁrst natural proxy
re-encryption scheme with non-transferable property
without obfuscation or involving PKG in the identity
based setting. Furthermore, we discuss our scheme’s
application to social cloud storage sharing, such as
secure photos sharing, etc. Our scheme can be used
to solve the difﬁcult transferability problem, which
can reduce the data owner’s worries about their un-
controlled data sharing. There are several interesting
aspects that can be further explored, such as proving
our proposals’ security formally, proposing more efﬁ-
cient non-transferable proxy re-encryption scheme in
the prime order group, etc.
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